This competition did not merely lie in either side's seizing opportunities to dem onstrate its power. From the beginning a major part o f the Republic's strategic re sponse to the Dutch return had been diplomatic. While firmly opposing the Dutch in principle, they attempted to enlist the Allies and the United Nations (the two were seen as much the same th in g), if not as supporters then at least as disinter ested arbiters. This attempt did not produce the desired result, and it soon became clear that there would be a protracted struggle. Greater emphasis was then laid on the development of the economy and the Republican state apparatus, both to streng then the Republic's ability to meet the Dutch diplomatically and militarily and to en sure that the growth of Dutch power could be halted. At the same time, the Dutch were convinced of the necessity to restore the pattern o f efficient administration on which they had prided themselves before the war. They believed the quality of their rule to be their strongest point in any comparison with the Republic, and they, too, concentrated on developing the economy and administration of the areas they controlled. Since money lies at the heart o f such matters, conflict in the field of currency became inevitable.
Both the Republic and the Dutch faced a situation where the currency was seri ously affected by three-and-a-half years o f Japanese occupation. At the beginning of their occupation, the Japanese had issued a temporary occupation currency [gunpyo] , nominally at par with the prewar guilder. In March 1943, notes o f the Nanpo Kaihatsu Kinko [Southern Development Bank], produced in Kolff's printing works in Jakarta and known generally as oeang Djepang, or oeang pisang [banana money] from the bananas which were a prominent part of their design, were brought into circulation and at the same time the Japanese issued instructions that all pre war currency was to be handed in to them .1 This regulation was far from strictly enforced, and even Dutch internees continued to be able to use their savings to buy food and other necessities from Indonesian and Chinese sellers. As the Japa nese authorities printed and spent increasing amounts of money, however, serious inflation began. Prices rose rapidly, exacerbated by a wartime shortage of goods. 1 2 People hoarded the old Netherlands Indies currency as a security against the depre ciation o f the Japanese guilder and the possibility of a Japanese defeat. At the end of the war, therefore, transactions were almost universally conducted in Japanese notes, which were politically unpopular and the value of which continued to depre ciate rapidly.
In a presidential proclamation on October 3, 1945, Sukarno recognized both prewar Netherlands Indies currency and Japanese occupation currency as legal tender. 3 Soon afterwards, however, A. A. Maramis, the Minister of Finance in 1. J. E. Spinosa Cattela, "Monetaire problemen in Indie," Economisch-Statistische Berichten, 30 [Jakarta] , February 10, 1946; for figures on the increase in circulation of Japanese currency during the occupation, see Spinosa Cattela, "Monetaire proble men," p. 262. Figures on the gross circulation of currency from 1942 on can give no more than a general indication o f the state o f affairs, for there is no way to ac count for the loss or destruction of notes. Nor has it always been possible to dis tinguish between circulations on Java, on Sumatra, and in East Indonesia, which remained administratively separate and economically largely isolated throughout the Japanese occupation, although all these areas used the same currency, with the exception o f a f.100 note issued only on Sumatra.
3. Merdeka [Jakarta], October 5, 1945.
Sukarno's presidential cabinet, was making plans to issue a new Republican cur rency ( oeang Republik Indonesia, or ORI). The chief problem, as Maramis saw it at the time, was an abundance o f money in the economy. According to his esti mates, the Japanese had put f.2,200 million into circulation, f. 1,570 o f it on Java and Madura. There were an additional f.462.5 million or so in Java Bank and pre war Netherlands Indies government currency notes, which had been in circulation when the war began and which, although no longer circulating, were beyond the control o f any government. He argued that, since the Allies would not recognize the Japanese currency and since it would be overoptimistic to expect the Dutch to back their currency with the gold reserves they had removed to Australia just be fore the Japanese invasion, the Republic itself must be responsible for creating the stable monetary conditions necessary for economic recovery. He proposed that both Japanese and prewar Netherlands Indies currency be accepted for exchange at par against yet-to-be-issued Republican guilders, or rupiah. In order to keep circula tion manageable, however, those paying in would receive at most only 5 percent of the value o f their money; the rest would be a national loan, repayable in fifty to seventy-five years, and bearing interest at 2 percent. * * Maramis' plans were cast within the framework o f a Republican vision o f the fu ture, but they were not really revolutionary, in that they were not directed against specific Dutch monetary or other policies, and indeed assumed an absence o f posi tive Dutch monetary policies. Sukarno had in fact tried to influence the Allies by urging Mountbatten to announce officially that Japanese currency would be recog nized at par with prewar Netherlands Indies cu rre n cy .4 5 The initial preparations for issuing ORI, therefore, were an administrative rather than a political act, al though the propaganda value of currency was well recognized. The notes, printed in Jakarta at the state printing works and dated October 17, 1945, bore a portrait of Sukarno and a picture of an erupting volcano, reportedly Sukarno's metaphor o f the Revolution as a fiery, destructive outburst which leaves the surrounding land fertile once it is over. 6 According to British intelligence reports, there were firm plans to issue the new currency on February 1, 1946, and a few o f the notes ap peared in the markets in Jakarta before this. 7 The majority, however, reportedly three metric tons in weight, were captured by the Allies in mid-January 1946, when they occupied the state printing works. 8 The plates, however, were apparently saved, for, when the ORI was finally issued officially nine months later, in October 1946, the notes were of the same design, signed by Maramis, and dated October 17, 1945. On the Dutch side the question of the postwar currency for the Netherlands Indies had been raised within the Netherlands government-in-exile in London as early as August 1942. The Netherlands Indies had had its own currency before the war, with the semiofficial Java Bank issuing bank notes and the government itself issuing coins and currency notes [muntbiljetten] . The currency had been linked to, but distinct from, that of The Netherlands, and in 1942 it was proposed that the tie be loosened somewhat in expectation o f postwar constitutional changes. It was decided that the Netherlands Indies guilder would be replaced by a specifi cally Indies currency, a decision that, it seems, was less a political than an economic and financial one, for, despite a certain amount of argument in favor of an Indies design for the new Indies currency, van Mook, then Minister o f Colonies in the gov ernment-in-exile, decided to retain the old, purely Dutch design. 9 Attention had to be given, however, not only to the eventual financial character of the Netherlands Indies currency but to the more pressing problem o f monetary rehabilitation imme diately after the war. Direct government monetary authority was viewed as neces sary to avoid a period of monetary chaos, and on March 2, 1943, the Netherlands Indies government was authorized by royal decree to issue currency notes o f f.5 and higher. The distinctive feature o f such notes was that, unlike bank notes, they were not backed by the gold reserves of a circulation bank bu t, like coins, simply bore their value on the authority o f the government that issued them. The notes themselves were printed in the United States by the American Bank Note Com pany. It was presumably the completion or part completion of this printing which enabled the government to proceed in February 1944 with the logical corollary o f its original decision: the removal from the Java Bank of the right to issue currency.
E. T. Kuiper
Like so many other Dutch plans concerning the reoccupation o f Indonesia, those for the withdrawal of the Japanese occupation currency and the introduction of the 800 million or so gouvernementsgulden, printed in America but already brought over to Australia, were thrown into confusion when the Japanese surrendered on August 14, 1945, while still in control o f most o f the archipelago. The relatively small administrative apparatus the Netherlands Indies government-in-exile had set up in Australia, which as part of the Allied forces had become the Netherlands In dies Civil Administration (NICA), was geared to restoring Dutch authority piece meal, as areas were liberated by the advancing Allies. This had indeed occurred reasonably smoothly in those areas captured before the Japanese surrender--Hollandia, Biak, Morotai, Balikpapan, and Tarakan.10 There NICA had been able to es tablish an administration, introduce the new currency (known generally as Nicageld, oeang Nica, or, from its color, oeang merah--red money), and dump at sea stores of Japanese currency notes. Such action, however, could not be taken throughout all of Indonesia at once and in Brisbane,on the eve of the Japanese sur render, presumably in anticipation of the official announcement, it was decided not to declare the Japanese currency worthless immediately, principally on the grounds that there was no prompt way of substituting NICA money for i t . 11 It was consid ered better to postpone briefly the return to Netherlands Indies currency in order to avoid the problems of a long transition period. Events after the surrender showed this to have been a wise decision. In Kalimantan and East Indonesia, where the Allies imposed their authority rela tively early, they were able to introduce NICA currency with little difficulty, though Japanese currency continued to circulate on Sulawesi until February 1, 1946, and on Flores until mid-February, while on Belitung it was a commercial company, the Billiton-Maatschappij, which itself issued the first temporary postwar cu rren cy .12 On Java and Sumatra, however, the Allies were not able to occupy more than their few coastal enclaves and, under the surrender provisions dictated by the Allies, the Japanese thus retained responsibility for maintaining law, order, and the political status quo over large areas o f the country, a task for which they often had some lack of enthusiasm. Ch. van der Plas, representative o f the Netherlands Indies government to SEAC [South East Asia Command], quickly recognized a potentially serious problem: if the Japanese currency were declared worthless, or even if it lost its value as a result of the Japanese defeat, the Japanese would not be able to carry on their administrative ta sk s.13 1 4 Japanese administration as such had little to commend it to the Dutch, but they considered any administration better than the chaos they anticipated developing in a power vacuum. Dutch monetary policies in the postwar Netherlands Indies thus began paradoxically with a delib erate attempt to support the occupation currency of the enemy. Not only did the Japanese money remain legal tender on Java and Sumatra, but there was a ban on the import into Java o f other currency, including NICA money, and on one occasion the Dutch crew of a plane from Balikpapan was arrested for bringing in NICA money.
Distribution problems severely limited Dutch currency policies; outside the Allied perimeters Java and Sumatra remained wholly inaccessible to the kind o f gov ernment apparatus necessary if the Dutch were to organize a rapid change o f cur rency, and the Dutch could do little about this outside the framework of their gen eral political relations with the Republic. Having accepted these restrictions, they were faced with the question of whether to introduce NICA money within the perim eters of Allied-occupied territory. The general arguments in favor o f this were strong. The Dutch had viewed technical excellence o f administration as the corner stone of their colonial rule in the twentieth century, and careful control o f the monetary system was a part of this. They might expect the task of economic recon struction in the Netherlands Indies to take some time, but without control o f the financial situation, they could not even make a start. The Dutch were also sensi tive to the likely economic consequences for the unwise and poor if they left Japa nese currency in circulation. A prolonged period o f uncertainty and instability was likely to benefit only those in a position to manipulate the situation to the disadvan tage o f o th e r s.111 Politically, too, arguments for introduction seemed compelling, for the Dutch were being hurt by their inability to issue their own currency and by their enforced reliance on the currency of the defeated and disliked enemy occupa tion forces. At a time when "whiff o f grapeshot" theories for dealing with the Re public were influential, inability to control the currency was viewed as a highly undesirable sign o f powerlessness. economic policy can become one of our best weapons in the struggle for the restora tion of order and peace in this cou n try."16 The idea of issuing the currency only in the occupied enclaves, however, had changed the terms on which its introduc tion could be considered. Implicit in such a restriction was a recognition that the Japanese currency, whatever its legal status and economic basis, actually had a certain economic p ow er.17 This faced the Dutch with a problem o f quasi-interna tional financial relations: could NICA money, based in three-and-a-half enclaves on Java, outperform the Japanese currency with its basis in the hinterland?
It was politically and economically essential for the Dutch that NICA money re tain its value in contrast to the sharply depreciating Japanese currency. This, it was realized, was not a matter of relative political confidence; it was widely believed, both amongst the population at large and within Dutch ruling circles, that some offi cial value would ultimately be set on the Japanese currency, and once the principle of exchangeability had been established, the rate of exchange would have to be fixed on more or less economic groun ds.18 Indeed, it was NICA money, not the Japanese money, that would be vulnerable politically, since the Republic in antici pation had refused it recognition. Within the Allied enclaves, therefore, the ex change rate was likely to be set by the relative buying power of the two currencies. Buying power in turn depended on imports, for there was still relatively little manu facturing or food production within the enclaves, and here the Dutch were at a serious disadvantage. There was a severe postwar shortage o f goods and cargo space, while the Dutch lacked the foreign exchange and credit needed to buy what was available, and were further hampered by black bans against their shipping im posed by pro-Republic waterside workers in Australian ports. And without con sumer goods to sell for NICA money, there was little the Dutch could do to make its possession an attractive proposition. The NIGIEO (Nederlands-Indisch Gouvernements Im-en Export-Organisatie), set up in 1943 with an official monopoly of trade to and from the Netherlands Indies in many commodities, together with the Department of Economic Affairs of which it was a part, eventually succeeded in o r ganizing a limited flow of goods to Indonesia. These included redundant American war supplies and goods purchased with Canadian credit and shipped across the Pacific in Netherlands Indies government vessels specially built in Oregon during the war. It was some time into 1946, however, before this flow reached sizeable proportions and until then there was little to give value to NICA money.
In the second place, there was the problem of Netherlands Indies currency issued in the prewar period. In 1942, there had been about f.362.5 million in Java Bank notes in circulation, together with f.100 million in government currency notes and f.195 million in co in s .19 Moreover, according to intelligence reports, after the capitulation the Japanese had spent f.57.5 million in prewar Java Bank notes which they had taken from the main Java Bank safe in Bandung. 20 Of this total o f about f.715 million, there was little in active circulation, due to hoarding, but this was likely to change if people interpreted the introduction o f NICA guilders as a sign of returning economic stability. van Mook had in fact promised that prewar currency would retain its value in rela tion to NICA money.21 Whatever exchange rate might ultimately be decided for Japa nese currency, therefore, a substantial amount of what would have to be regarded as NICA money was already in potential circulation. With many of these notes pre sumably in the interior, where, unlike NICA money, they were accepted as legal tender, and without an effective tax apparatus or a large stock of consumer goods to sell, the Netherlands Indies government had no immediate means of reducing cir culation: to have added the new currency to the economy at this stage would simply have encouraged further inflation. 22 A partial solution appeared possible through use of a device applied already in Kalimantan and East Indonesia, where there was a similar problem of prewar currency still in circulation. There only Java Bank and currency notes of f.10 and below were authorized as legal tender alongside NICA money; higher denominations were simply frozen until control over the money sup ply was regained, and thus the inflationary effect o f too much money was reduced.23 2 4 On Java, however, the situation was complicated by the continued circulation of Japanese currency and by the existence of an unofficial rate of exchange between it and the prewar guilder that, at 10-12:1, was much too far below the rate o f 33:1 which the Dutch had in mind. 21* If NICA money were introduced, the risk was that its value would be dragged down by that of the prewar guilder. 25 The situation, in short, was highly unpromising for NICA money, and a representative of the Java Bank gave the blunt advice:
. . . under the present circumstances an introduction o f new Netherlands Indies currency on Java and Sumatra would have catastrophic effects on our monetary system, with all the resulting consequences for the economic development of these regions.
[Original emphasis]
Such considerations, indirectly political, were supplemented by direct argu ments which carried steadily more force as the Dutch took growing account of the power of the Republic. Unfortunately for the Dutch, van Mook's 1942 decision against an Indische design for the postwar currency had led to the printing of notes with a Dutch text and dominated by a picture of Queen Wilhelmina, which thereby cast a suggestion o f doubt on Dutch announcements that they were not re turning simply to restore the old colonial order. The few NICA notes which inad vertently entered circulation on Java in 1945 aroused such aversion from both the Republicans and their government that the Dutch were somewhat doubtful whether they would be accepted even in the enclaves. Van discontent, outbursts of violence and possibly a popular revolt" if the notes were introduced. 27 Moreover, he pointed out, whether or not NIC A money circulated in the enclaves, its proscription by the Republic ensured that no one living outside them would dare to sell produce in exchange for the currency. The cities, largely dependent on imports for their food supplies, would be cut o ff. Finally, in view of the Republic's hostility to NICA money, the tentative negotiations towards a politi cal settlement which were under way would be jeopardized and, moreover, the Dutch would bear the blame for what the world would see as unnecessary provocation. 28
Thus the currency of the Japanese military administration not only remained in circulation but continued as the official tender o f the government. The Allies had captured about two-and-a-half thousand million guilders in Japanese currency when they occupied the main banks and the Kolff printing works in Jakarta in early Octo ber, and it was this, together with such subsidiary acquisitions as forty chests of Japanese currency, valued at f.100 million, brought from Bandung by Dakota in January, that the Dutch used to finance the costs of restoring their administration.29 Many Allied needs were met simply by requisition from the Japanese, who were au thorized to print extra money to pay for i t . 30 Large sums, however, were also spent directly by the Dutch, and the combined result was a rapid increase in the money supply. The exact dimensions o f this increase are hard to estimate, since the available sets o f figures are widely divergent and none is particularly convinc ing on close analysis. Moreover, the Dutch also alleged later that the Japanese had issued f. 1,500 million more than their records showed. There is a consensus, how ever, that an initial circulation of between f . 369 million and f . 2,700 million in August 1945 rose sharply as a result of postcapitulation spending, reaching perhaps f . 3,500-4,000 million and possibly as much as f. 8,000 million. 31 Inflation, already well es tablished in Japanese times, continued apace, and Dutch officials, who received f. 1,000 (Japanese) per month as "pocket money" (salaries were credited rather than paid, in an effort to isolate NICA money from the inflation), found it insufficient even for food. 32 The situation was aggravated by the activity o f counterfeiters.33
With both the Dutch and the Republic unable, for their respective reasons, to issue their own currency, the lines of conflict were drawn more in theory than in practice. The small amounts of either currency in circulation served as a taste of things to come, rather than as a cause for concern in themselves. Even at this stage, however, the Republic was making a serious effort to obstruct the monetary 27. Van No official pen alty for possessing NICA money was laid down at this stage, but inspection patrols of pemuda in the pasar, together with unofficial executions of those caught dealing in it, made it clear that this ban would be enforced. In itself, the ban was a politi cal, rather than an economic act; NICA money was unacceptable at this stage be cause it was an aspect of Dutch authority, not because the Republic expected any specific undesirable economic or financial effects from its circulation. But the ban was effective primarily for economic reasons: exclusion of NICA money from the Javanese hinterland transformed the conflict, even before it had started, from one between the rival authority of two regimes to one between the rival economic power of two regions. This may in fact have been Hatta's intention when announcing that the new currency would be based on a-metalism, that is, that it would be backed by valuable and durable goods, rather than by gold. 3 4 35 For the time being at least, it put the conflict to the advantage of the Republic.
Political considerations, however, also led the Republic to revise its plans to introduce ORI. The initiative here came from the British. Indonesian opinion was firmly in favor of issuing ORI as soon as possible. 36 The Dutch, o f course, would have been glad to advise in the matter, but lacked the necessary sympathetic audi ence. The British, however, through whom the Republicans believed they addressed the world, were a different matter. In January 1946, M. E. Dening, Foreign Office political adviser to SEAC, told representatives of the Republic bluntly that for the Republic to issue its own currency would be the best way to wreck the economy of the country. 37 His message was reinforced later that month by W. A. M. Doll, a treasury official specially sent out as adviser to SEAC, who argued that in issuing its own currency the Republic would be marching in the face o f the entire organized machinery of international cooperation in the monetary economic field. "These are international forces," he warned, "which do not let themselves be defied and which have a deep rooted aversion to dilettantist experiments in monetary a ffa irs ."38 These arguments were economic, but they were presented for essentially political reasons: in order to keep open the possibility of a negotiated settlement it was necessary to avoid reinforcing organizational and structural differences between the two sides. The issue of Republican currency would be a step difficult to undo and would bring in its wake a cloud o f economic difficulties which could only delay 34. Merdeka, October 2, 1945. As the editor of De Nieuwsgier pointed out at the time, the circulation in Jakarta had a diversity approaching that of prewar China. In addition to the four forms o f currency with some legal backing--prewar Nether lands Indies currency, Japanese currency, NICA money, and ORI-there were Brit ish pounds, American dollars, Indian rupees, Straits dollars, and and complicate a settlement. It was presumably a more explicit statement of this attitude that led Sjahrir to undertake at least not to introduce the new currency before he had considered van Mook's proposals.39 4 0 4 1 4 2 4 3 4 4 This undertaking, however, be came somewhat irrelevant with the capture of the stock of Republican currency notes in mid-January, coyly referred to in the Republican press at the time as "technical difficulties. " 1,0 Sjahrir also believed that some sort of understanding had been reached whereby neither side would issue its own currency until a settle ment had been achieved. Whether he misinterpreted the situation or was deceived, he was soon disappointed by the turn of events.
The British did not play an entirely consistent game. In October 1945, accord ing to reports, one group of British officers was advising Hatta to accept the NICA money while another group encouraged him to go ahead with issuing Republican money. At the same time, Mountbatten was urging that NICA money not be intro duced, in order to avoid provoking the Indonesians. ^ Two months later, however, on December 10, Lt. Gen. Christison, Allied Commander in the Netherlands Indies, wrote to van Mook asking him to introduce NICA money into circulation on January 1, 1946. Moderate Indonesians, he argued, were likely to accept it (this came as a surprise to the Dutch, whose own intelligence sources suggested quite the oppo site), and it was the only way to prevent a collapse of the economic structure of the re g io n .1,2 Christison was also highly dissatisfied with the temporary arrangements for crediting salary and paying pocket money to the troops. British troops, it was argued, wanted solid payment, in an internationally recognized currency, rather than gifts of Japanese occupation money, and the British had moral objections to paying their workforce and suppliers in Japanese currency when it was losing value by the week. 93 These complaints were partly met by a payment o f f.2 million in NICA money to the British for use by soldiers in army canteens, on condition that it was not used outside. After the Dutch had forcefully argued the technical diffi culties of introducing the new currency by the proposed deadline, it was agreed to postpone the introduction to February 1.
In the interval, however, the Dutch Minister of Colonies, J. H. A. Logemann, suspecting that Christison was acting on his own initiative, made enquiries in London and found that neither the Treasury, 39. NIC note.
40. RVD, "Wekelijksche Kroniek no. 4," January 2, 1946, Rapp. Indon. , box A, file 1. The Dutch had their own "technical difficulties" getting their supplies of NICA money through the pro-Indonesian dock strikes in Australia, although these difficulties were not in fact reponsible for the delays in issuing NICA money, since some supplies were flown in, and the remainder arrived early in March 1946 aboard the Australian warship Bungaree. By early February,the Dutch had reportedly also begun printing 1$ and 10$ notes in Kolff's printing works in Jakarta. See Gotzen, "Nota inzake muntzuivering," Abruptly, however, the British and Dutch reversed positions. Van Mook's codetelegram of February 5, reporting to Logemann that the monetary measures had indeed been halted, noted that the halt would not be indefinite. Allied stocks o f Japanese currency would run out in six weeks at the latest and action would have to be taken before then. 96 In an inflationary economy, the Dutch had been prodi gious spenders, and of the two-and-a-half thousand million Japanese guilders cap tured from the banks and from Kolff s in October only f.450 million remained. 97 The reprinting of Japanese notes was considered, but unknown saboteurs had destroyed the printing plates for the Japanese notes at K olff s and it would take two months to replace them .1,8 The Dutch also had serious moral and economic reservations in the matter, and, moreover, there was a growing feeling that the current state of af fairs could not continue indefinitely.1 19 And finally, there was fear of the conse quences for Dutch prestige if the Republicans beat them to the gun in issuing their own currency. 4 5 4 6 4 7 4 8 4 9 50 If a change were to be made, it was felt, this was as good an op portunity as any. 51 For the British, on the other hand, the opportunity was not as good as any. Both Christison and Dening were nearing the end o f their terms of duty and both were aware that the introduction of NICA money was likely to sour relations between the Dutch and the Republic and to worsen the security situation. As they had argued to the Republic, the introduction of a new currency could only hamper progress towards a political settlement, and no other kind o f settlement was then possible. Doll supported them with powerful economic arguments (the same arguments used previously by the Dutch to resist introduction), but there was little that the British could do. The Dutch could not be expected to govern without money. The introduction of NICA money was set for midnight on March 6. An ex change rate o f 3:100 against the Japanese guilder was laid down. To reduce circu lation, only prewar Java Bank and government currency notes o f f.5 and below were accepted in exchange for the new currency; the rest were frozen. And the govern ment adopted a policy o f paying its employees only the minimum necessary propor tion o f their salaries. 52 In short, the chief economic obstacles to the success of the new currency were tackled as well as possible. The political obstacles remained another matter.
Predictably, the introduction of NICA money did little to sweeten relations be tween the Republic and the Dutch, or for that matter between the Republic and the British. In his earlier attempts to persuade the Dutch to introduce their new cur rency, Christison had promised to announce officially that he, as Allied Commander, regarded it as the only legal tender in the land. His successor, Lt. Gen. Stop ford kept this promise; indeed, even without the promise he could hardly have done otherwise. He issued the following brief proclamation on March 6: Whereas 1st a sound currency system shall be introduced in order to prevent com plete collapse of the economic structure o f the country and to create a medium of exchange as a condition for the restoration of normal trade, 2nd the Netherlands being the recognized sovereign power, the sole legal tender will be the N .E.I. currency, which is the internationally ac cepted currency of this country. 53 5 4
Sjahrir was very upset by the introduction, and van Mook thought that the Republi cans were generally more hostile to the new currency than to the landing o f Dutch troops. Sh The Indonesian press and radio began a vigorous campaign against what was called the Dutch "economic offensive." The Republican Ministry of Finance immediately issued a statement that the presidential decree of October 1945, setting Japanese and prewar Netherlands Indies currency as the only legal tender until ORI was issued, remained in force, and a penalty o f five years imprisonment was laid down for those found using NICA money. 55 Colonel Singgih o f the TRI Regiment in Tanggerang also issued a warning that anyone caught with NICA money would be punished, 56 and the bodies of those unfortunate enough to be discovered by the pemuda carrying NICA notes began to appear in public places with the offending notes attached as a warning. 57
With such events occurring even within the Dutch-controlled enclaves, shop keepers were understandably reluctant to accept the new currency and people traveling beyond Jakarta positively refused it, until black market operators set up currency exchanges at appropriate points along the demarcation line. 58 There were strikes in Jakarta's port, Tanjung Priok, against payment in NICA money, and the Republican branch of the combined police force in Jakarta refused to accept i t . 59 (Dutch intelligence suggested that this reluctance had more to do with dissatisfac tion at the rate at which the workers were to be paid than with a principled aver sion to NICA money, and indeed rumors were appearing in the Republican press that the salaries which the Dutch had been paying their Indonesian employees in Japanese currency were to be converted to the new currency at a rate o f 50:1 or less, instead o f the official 33: 1.) 60 Supplies of rice from the interior dwindled, and the situation was aggravated by the still unsolved problem of a shortage of goods to be bought for NICA money; 61 Logemann objected to wasting good foreign exchange on goods to be sold for what he called "the practically worthless NICAp a p e r ."62 The immediate result was a slump in the value of the new currency, to the dismay of the Dutch. The new guilder fell in value from f.33 (Japanese), to f.25 by the end of March, and continued falling steadily in the following months, reaching f. 10 in J u n e.63 6 4 With Dutch exchange offices still offering the new guilders at 1:33, there was little interest in converting Japanese currency. Some Dutch, or their sympathizers, tried to support the official rate of exchange in the markets by insisting to sellers who gave the price of goods in Japanese currency that they be allowed to pay in NICA money at the official rate o f exchange. Since this insistence could sometimes be backed by the Dutch police, sellers often began to give their prices in NICA money. The rate of exchange, however, was not a ffected .61* Even tually the Dutch also tried selling small amounts o f Japanese currency for NICA money at the official exchange rate. Since those taking advantage of this offer re ceived more than twice as many Japanese guilders for their NICA money as they were likely to get on the open market, it was hoped that they would be encouraged to value NICA guilders more highly, which would eventually result in a more favor able rate o f exchange. Again, however, there was no lasting e ffe c t .65 In time, it became difficult to find sellers willing to take NICA money, even at a low exchange rate. The Dutch began to complain that it was accepted only in the NAAFI and the YMCA, and they set up a small office where Dutch housewives could exchange f.6 per week in NICA money for Japanese guilders in order to be able to go shopping in the m arkets.66
Once NICA money had been introduced, there were no longer strong political or diplomatic reasons for the Republic to refrain from issuing its own currency. The Dutch were seen as having acted in bad faith and, whether or not the Republic was aware o f it, there was a certain feeling in some foreign financial quarters that, assuming the conflict was going to be protracted, an official Republican currency, regulated and controlled by the Republican government, was preferable to the con tinued circulation of the Japanese currency. 67 This is not to say that the Republi can currency would be greeted enthusiastically; the British had kept up a certain amount of pressure on the Republic not to go ahead with issuing ORI68 and there was no possibility of its receiving international recognition separate from an even tual international recognition of the Republic. International reaction, which was likely to be muted, was not of fundamental importance to the Republic; what was important was whether or not the new currency was a success, and whether or not it retained its value and enabled the Republic to bring its economy under some sort o f control. Internal political opinion had always strongly favored the introduction of ORI, and it was logical, both for the sake o f prestige and self-respect and in order to provide the much-needed mechanisms o f economic control, that the Repub lic issue its new currency. There was, then, considerable domestic pressure on Sjahrir and his Finance Minister Soerachman to go ahead with introducing ORI, and this was reinforced by reports that the Dutch were smuggling Japanese currency into the Republic. 69 Moreover, like the Dutch, the Republic had a pressing finan cial reason for replacing the Japanese currency: they were running out of it. The vaults o f the Japanese banks in Malang, Surabaya, Yogyakarta, and Solo had yield ed between six and seven hundred million Japanese guilders for the use of the Re public, 70 somewhat less than the Dutch had obtained. From October 1945 until March 1946 the Republic had an income of f.118.5 million, much of it from taxes of various kinds, with a proportion from the sale o f petrol, forest products, salt, and opium. In the same period it spent f . 402.7 million, of which f.246 million, over 58 percent, went for the army, which was nonetheless critically short of funds. 71 As in the case of the Dutch, the Republic's supply of Japanese currency was a limited, depreciating resource, for the Republic was not yet sufficiently organized to collect taxes on a scale to match its expenditure. As a matter of economic survival some form of action was becoming necessary. 72
Technical difficulties, in the broad sense, had already caused delay and they continued to do so. After the Dutch had confiscated the first run o f notes in Janu ary 1946, printing operations were shifted to the Kolff printing works at Malang in East Java. The works, however, were small and could manage only a limited output, and so the printers decided to print only one side o f the notes, until persuaded by a visit from the local army unit that two sides would be more appropriate for the national currency of the Republic. Only higher denominations had serial numbers, often in fact the same serial number, since there was no mechanism for automatically rolling the numbers on. It was reported, however, that printing was completed by the end o f July. 73 7 4
Economic considerations, nonetheless, caused the Republic to act with circum spection. In his original consideration of the currency problem, Maramis had noted the problem of excess circulation and had suggested a solution in the partial ex change and partial deposit of prewar Netherlands Indies and Japanese occupation currency. Maramis, however, had left the cabinet in November 1945, and his suc cessors apparently did no more to reduce circulation in preparation for the influx o f new money than to urge the population to save. 7< t 1946, however, saw the return of numbers o f Indonesians who had spent the war in The Netherlands. Many had been students there, and some had received financial and economic training, such as Sumitro Djojoadikusumo and Ong Eng Die. These two men were soon playing im portant roles in the formulation of financial and economic policy, and their influence led to speculation in Allied circles that the Republic had somehow managed to find a Swiss financial adviser. 75 Like the Dutch from whom they had received their training, in approaching the problem of introducing the new currency they paid a great deal of attention to the problem of excessive circulation o f the old.
The first step towards solving both the problem of excessive liquidity and that of the government's emptying coffers was the floating o f a National Loan ( Pindjaman Nasional) on May 9, 1946. Citing the obligation of the population to support Repub lican goals, the government set the loan at f. 1,000 million, half to be subscribed by Java and Madura, half by Sumatra. Repayment was to be within forty years and, when the new currency was issued, all loans were to be converted to it at the offi cial rate. 76 The loan attracted only about f.318 million on Java and f.208 million on Sumatra, most reportedly by small depositors. 77 The wealthy of all races, it was complained, abstained, and the result was disappointing. Further measures were needed to control the money supply, and on July 12 a regulation was introduced for Java and Madura that all cash had to be deposited in banks by July 15. The only exceptions were that householders were permitted f. 3,000 per month to cover expenses, unmarried individuals f . 1,000, and businesses f. 1,000-10,000, depending on profits. 78 As the much-postponed day of issue of the ORI approached, it was announced that all remaining money should be deposited by October 26 (October 30 for businesses), with the exception of f.50 per person to tide the population over the few days before the planned date of issue, October 31. All Japanese currency then in deposit would be converted to rupiah at the official rate of 50:1, after due investigation into how its owners had come by it. A further R p .l would be dis tributed to each person in order to get circulation going again and in recognition of the f.50 retained during the transition period. Any Japanese currency still in circulation would then be declared worthless and would not be exchangeable for ORI. 79 These measures were based on the postwar geldsaneering carried out in The Netherlands by Finance Minister Lieftinck, who had in fact taught Sumitro in Rotterdam. His saneering was a political rather than an economic act. Under it, a new design of bank note was introduced and people could only exchange their old banknotes for new if they gave an adequate account of how they had received them. The intention was that no one should profit from activities during the German occu pation which they could not justify in public. The so-called tientje van Lieftinck ( f . 10) was issued to every person in order to start circulation off again and to cover the period up until people received their first wages or salary in new notes.
In the Indonesian case, compulsory deposit made economic sense as a means o f avoiding excessive circulation o f currency during the transition period, and the consequent inflationary effects on the new currency. It also helped alleviate suspi cions that speculators were profiting at the expense of the people. It had addition al political advantages. In many Republican areas, opposition groups with ties to independent and independent-minded armed groups both in and out of the army were resisting the efforts of the Republican leaders to create a strong state appara tus and entrench their own positions. attempts to avoid government control, which they interpreted as partisan control by groups which happened to be the government, was their independent economic base. For political reasons, then, they could never have been persuaded to put their funds at the disposal of the government, but it was difficult for them to re fuse this demand when it was presented as part of an economic exercise o f which no one could disapprove.80
The introduction of ORI made a noteworthy contribution to the prestige and power o f the Republic within its own borders. In a radio address to the people, Hatta introduced it as a symbol o f independence and the basis for economic develop ment. 81 As an instrument for attacking the Dutch it was less of an innovation, though it did reinforce the exclusion of Dutch economic influence from the interior already established by bans on possession of NICA money. Within the urban en claves the field of currency now offered additional scope for conflict, although on the same lines as before. Two currencies, each backed by a rival government, were already competing for preference in the market place and a favorable exchange rate. ORI now replaced one of those currencies, and this widened the scope for action by the Republic, since it now had a currency it could positively promote, but also increased its vulnerability. The stakes were higher, but the conflict itself was materially unchanged.
During the year prior to the introduction of ORI, organized Republican hostil ity had contributed to the difficulties of the NICA money, but the fundamental causes of those difficulties had lain in the currency's own weaknesses which the Dutch themselves had recognized at the time o f issue and which were independent of Republican monetary tactics. The most fundamental of these was its position as the currency of an economically non-self-supporting enclave. Unable to buy rice from the interior or more luxury goods from abroad, NICA money initially derived its value primarily from the expectation that it would eventually have buying power. The four months following its introduction, in which its value slipped to one half, gave the Dutch great cause of concern. Apart from ineffectual direct interventions into the money market (see above, p. 125), they concentrated on the import of goods, both as a monetary measure and in order to satisfy demand amongst the growing civil and military establishment in the enclaves. The problem of the unac ceptability of NICA money for buying products from the interior could not be tack led by such supply-side economics, but, as long as Japanese currency circulated freely on both sides of the border and as long as NICA money maintained a reason able rate against i t , there was a relatively stable situation, far from satisfactory for the Dutch, but at least not alarming. By the time that ORI was introduced, more than a year after the Japanese surrender, the pasar exchange rate of the NICA guilder with the Japanese guilder had stabilized at around 1:15-20, 82 and preparations were finally under way to replace NICA currency with new gold-backed notes o f the Java Bank. 83 The supply of manufactured goods purchaseable with NICA money was also reaching respectable proportions. 80. One example, cited in Dutch sources, is that o f Dr. Moewardi o f the Barisan Banteng in Solo, who, together with Tan Malaka and Achmad Subardjo, tried to set up a bank and to obtain recognition of it as a deposit and issue bank for exchange purposes. When the government refused, however, there was little they could do. The issue of ORI presented the Netherlands Indies government with one imme diate problem. With Japanese notes becoming worthless in the interior, those peo ple who had not deposited their money in Republican banks would probably rush to exchange their cash at the official Dutch exchange offices in the enclaves. This was dealt with fairly effectively by an announcement that exchange offices would close for the last time on October 30, 1946, though the Dutch felt some reluctance to be seen responding in any way to the monetary policies of the Republic. 81* With the introduction of ORI, however, the Dutch were also given an opportuni ty to improve their position. As Japanese currency no longer circulated, there was no longer a neutral medium of exchange between the enclaves and the Republic. The Republic intended the rupiah to take over the functions o f the Japanese guil der, but the Dutch, o f course, objected to this. The circulation o f former occupa tion currency, freely exchangeable with the legal tender o f the land, for a limited period in the interests of economic stability, differed fundamentally from the circu lation of the currency of what was at best a rival government, at worst a band of rebels. As far as the Dutch were concerned, ORI could not simply inherit the posi tion of Japanese currency and, in particular, could not be given any official status or rate of exchange whatever. They realized, however, that this position would lead to the establishment o f black market currency exchanges to facilitate trade across the border, to the disadvantage of everyone except the currency traders themselves. On this basis the Dutch authorities approached the Republicans for a deal: they would permit the possession of ORI on Java and Sumatra in exchange for removal of the Republic's ban on possession of NICA money, at least in the so-called randgebieden, the areas surrounding the Dutch enclaves, or even throughout the territory of the Republic. They emphasized that the proposal was simply one o f tolerance and specifically excluded any recognition o f ORI as legal tender, or even the establishment of any kind of exchange rate for i t . 8 4 85
As this proposal was more or less consistent with the de facto recognition which the Republic was then working towards in the negotiations leading to the Linggajati Agreement, the Republican delegation of Soerachman, Maramis, and Sabaroeddin received it favorably. They were unable to persuade the Dutch to tolerate ORI in Kalimantan and East Indonesia as well, but they obtained a clause providing for special negotiations between the respective Departments of Economic Affairs to facil itate trade between the Republic and the Outer Islands.86 The proposal was then referred to Yogya, where it must have come in for some careful consideration. In its favor was the semirecognition it gained from the Dutch and the need to create some sort of momentum, or at least a favorable atmosphere,for the Linggajati nego tiations, together with some relief from economic inconvenience and suffering for the people in and around the occupied cities. It also promised to spare the rupiah from Dutch repression, though until then the Dutch had always preferred economics to crude coercion in trying to influence the monetary regime in their enclaves, for, as long as the enclaves remained dependent on Republican rice, the Dutch could hardly take effective measures against the rupiah necessary to buy i t . 87 On the other hand, if the proposal were for toleration o f both currencies throughout Java and Sumatra, it seemed to imply a de facto recognition of Dutch sovereignty in Jakarta, something the Republic had not been prepared to concede at any stage, regardless of concessions it had made concerning Dutch-controlled areas o f the Outer Islands.. Moreover, it would open the Republic to NICA money, thereby po tentially weakening the economic force with which the rupiah could battle for domi nance in Jakarta, not to mention the numerous undesirable internal consequences o f having NICA money circulating within the Republic. When the proposal returned to the Dutch, therefore, Yogya had ratified it, but only on the basis o f very nar row randgebieden, and in these terms it was signed on November 19, 1946. 88
Having failed to obtain significant change in the situation, the Dutch recognized the limits of their position: as long as NICA money could not buy rice from the in terior, they could not expect it to be the only currency circulating in Jakarta. On the other hand, by ensuring a flow of purchaseable goods, they could guarantee that the NICA guilder retained a respectable value. The Dutch realized that the strength of NICA money was circumscribed by their overall strategic position, par ticularly their confinement to the enclaves. Thus they came more and more to see the solution to their problems in the abolition o f that enclave status, either by a full political settlement with the Republic or by military expansion of the enclaves into economically self-supporting units. It was the latter option that they were eventually to follow, though this was a decision taken with far more than the mone tary system in mind.
The announcement in Ra'jat on October 3, 1946, that the introduction of ORI was imminent and that undeposited Japanese currency would become worthless, sent prices soaring throughout Java, as people, skeptical about seeing their money again after it had been deposited, rushed to the markets to convert their cash into g o o d s .89 The Republican press in Jakarta accused Chinese o f coming into the mar kets with jute sacks full of Japanese currency to buy whatever they could, and the price of rice in the city soared. 90 The unofficial rate of exchange against the NICA guilder reportedly fell to 120:1 and there was increased activity at official currency exchanges. 91 According to one report, food prices rose 3-4,000 percent and cloth ing prices 1-2,000 percent in the days just before the introduction of the new cur rency. 92 In other respects, however, the issue o f ORI ran fairly smoothly. The distribution of rupiah ran ahead o f schedule,with most areas o f the Republic on Java receiving them by October 27. Hatta announced on October 29 that the buy ing power of the rupiah should be about the same as the Netherlands Indies guilder before the war and that this could be equated with 0.5 grams pure gold, though this did not imply any adherence to a gold standard. 93 9 4 (Dutch experts were quick to pick up an internal inconsistency here: the gold-backed guilder had been worth only approximately 0.34 grams in gold .) 99 94. De Javasche Bank, "Uitgifte Republikeinsch geld." compulsorily deposited before the changeover (though it was limited to Rp.100 per person per month in order to restrain inflation) and from November 7 restricted amounts could be redeemed from the national loan. 95 There was some criticism of the quality of the paper and printing--Hatta reportedly suggested that the paper was so bad that it would in fact be hard to imitate 96--but all in all the period of transition seemed to have been weathered without difficulty.
In Jakarta there was a sense of euphoria at the arrival o f the long-awaited ORI notes, and slametan and dance parties accompanied the ceremonial distribution of single rupiah to the Indonesian population.9' The new money was much in demand, and the four-and-a-half million rupiah reportedly brought secretly into the city by RAPWI (Repatriation of Allied Prisoners of War and Internees) and other trains was insufficient to meet it. 98 People expected its introduction to mean an end to infla tion, and the wish was in part self-fulfilling. It had been agreed that there would be no official exchange rate between the rupiah and the NICA guilder, but, if both were compared to the Japanese guilder, prices in rupiah seemed lower. The greater such differences in price, the greater the demand for the rupiah, which, in turn, pushed its value still higher against the NICA guilder. If the official exchange rate between rupiah and Japanese guilder were compared directly with the normal unoffi cial rate between Dutch and Japanese guilders, this produced a rupiah-NICA guilder exchange rate of 1:3; if the comparison were based on the official rate between Dutch and Japanese guilders, it came out to 1:1.5. Republican posters in various parts o f the city informed the population that ORI would be introduced at par with NICA money but that it was hoped its value would rise, while other Republican an nouncements suggested exchange rates of R p. l : f . 10-30. 99 Although no political recognition o f NICA money was intended by these announcements, they were ac knowledgment that the Dutch currency had a certain economic power. In the mar ket on October 31, however, the rate tended to vary from 1:5 to about 1:13, and reportedly actually reached 1:30 in at least one area, while in buying goods the rupiah was ten to fifteen times stronger than the NICA gu ilder.100 Haji Agus Salim, it was reported, could eat a full meal for Rp.1.76, while lipstick that cost six NICA guilders could be had for only sixty Republican cents. Chinese traders tended to operate at 1 :2 .5 -3 .0 .101 The railways and trams, still run by the Republic, would accept only ORI, as would the telephone exchange, the fishermen at Pasar Ikan, and many small sellers all over Jakarta.102 With all kinds of rumors in circulation as to the correct exchange rate and the likely long-term reliability o f either cur rency, confusion was rife, and even the now invalid Japanese guilders continued to circulate for a time. (They remained legal tender, as far as the Republic was concerned, in Sumatra and Banten until the issue o f provisional local currencies later in the Revolution.)103 1 0 4 The confusion was exacerbated in the weeks following the introduction of ORI by the activities of armed and unarmed supporters of one currency or the other, who went about the pasar trying to influence market psy chology at the point of a gun or by similar means. Dutch soldiers confiscated ORI from some sellers and threatened to shoot others. TRI soldiers in one market in sisted that all transactions be conducted in the Republican currency. The Indone sian police simply confiscated any NICA money they found and forced sellers to sell in ORI at the prices laid down in the official Republican price-fixing regulations.101* As hostility to ORI itself was difficult to distinguish under such circumstances from hostility to its unrealistic exchange rate, many traders found it wiser simply to leave the markets for a few days until things had settled dow n. 105 In rural areas around Jakarta, peasants were sometimes required to show ORI notes to patrolling lasjkar (irregular troops) as proof of their Republican sympathies. Other Indone sians tried more subtle techniques to influence the exchange rate. Small amounts of ORI were distributed free at first to get the circulation going, or perhaps simply as payment of the R p. 1 allowance. On October 30, Indonesians were seen buying packets of cigarettes, which they distributed to followers,who proceeded to sell the individual cigarettes for Rp.0.07 or f.2 (NICA), representing an exchange rate of about 1:30. Other Indonesians were seen selling rice at Rp.0.15 or f. 1.5 0.106 Despite these and other measures to bolster the rupiah, its exchange rate be gan to fall at once. According to figures taken daily at 11:00 a.m. at the largest money-changer' s in Pasar Glodok in Jakarta, the value o f the rupiah (in denomina tions o f Rp.1-10) dropped during its first week o f official circulation from f.5.00 to f.2 .0 0 . By the beginning o f December it was f. 1.50; on December 31 it was at par with the NICA-guilder and still sinking. It lingered between eighty and ninety NICA cents in February, and then plunged again to 50$ in March and 30$ in J u ly .107 There were many variations from region to region, even from hour to hour, and entirely different exchange rates applied when buying goods, but the dominant ten dency was a series o f hesitations and falls. In part this was due to inflation o f the rupiah in the interior. The government' s income from taxes and enterprises was meager and it had to meet its obligations by printing money. By January 1947 it had printed Rp.310 million, just under half the total prewar circulation of the en tire country and equivalent to fifteen thousand million Japanese guilders at the October 1946 rate of exchange.108 As the state printing works still had limited capacity, production concentrated on notes o f Rp.100, the highest denomination. This in turn led to a severe shortage of change and a tendency for prices to rise to meet the currency available to pay them. In circulation, the quality of the notes deteriorated rapidly, exacerbating this problem .109 There were reports, too, of four or five laborers receiving as their wages a single, shared Rp.100 note which could only be exchanged for small change at a considerable lo s s .110 Forgery o f notes was rife, both within the Republic and in Jakarta, the first forgeries in Ja karta reportedly appearing three weeks before the official issue date of ORI. 111 On one occasion the Chinese editor o f the newspaper Chen Pao was found to have forged ORI on a large scale in Jakarta. The Dutch police eventually arrested him, on charges o f disturbing public order, but they did so with some reluctance; the rupiah had no legal status under Dutch law and thus it was no crime to falsify i t . 112 The Republic, however, reacted by placing heavy restrictions on travel by Chinese between Jakarta and the in terior.113 1 1 4 Hoarding was also portrayed as a major prob lem, and severe regulations were posted against it. Householders were forbidden to have more supplies than were necessary for a short period, shopkeepers were for bidden to hold large stocks, and farmers were forbidden to retain more o f their crops than was necessary for their own use, but there was little effective action that could be taken in the face of widespread lack of confidence in the currency. 114. De Javasche Bank, "Uitgifte Republikeinsch geld." publican government also attempted to deal with the situation by raising the charges for its services, such as postage, and by paying out salaries weekly instead of monthly, so as to reduce its employees' disposable income, but the effects were lim ited and the unpopularity generated great.
The value of the rupiah, however, declined more steeply in Jakarta than else where, and the chief reason for this was the Republican currency's deteriorating exchange rate vis-a-vis the NICA guilder.
Although not yet abundant, the amount of imported goods in Jakarta, on sale for NICA money, had increased substantially, and one reason behind the enormous flood of Japanese guilders into Jakarta on the eve o f the introduction of the ORI was to buy these goods. After the new currency appeared, it flowed steadily into Jakarta, where it was exchanged for NICA money, and spent in the well-stocked stalls and shops o f the metropolis. Idroes described the arrival of the speculators:
From the interior there came gods [ dewa] . They spoke tersely, their mouths full of figures, their pockets full of Republican money. If any one asked them: why have you come to Jakarta?, they would reply brief ly: business, and while they spoke their minds wandered to Pasar Glodok. . . . 11S
That rupiah were brought to Jakarta to purchase what were luxury goods by the standards of the Revolution caused resentment in the interior, and the availability of these items for guilders weakened the rupiah by creating a demand for guilders.116 Also important, however, was the constant flow of ORI into Jakarta to pay the sala ries o f the Republic's many employees th e re .117 Even though NICA money had, by virtue of the weight of the Dutch presence and authority in Jakarta, come to be used in an increasing proportion of transactions,118 the value o f the rupiah did not necessarily suffer as long as a balance was maintained between the outflow o f im ported goods and the inflow o f Javanese rice, on which Jakarta still depended. This balance, already under heavy pressure from purchasers o f imported goods, collapsed when the Indonesian armed forces around Jakarta imposed a blockade on the city, stopping a large proportion of the imports o f rice. The blockade began in late October 1946, and it ranged from a simple delaying of rice shipments on their way into Jakarta to the imposition of tolls and even confiscation. In some places the army revived a Japanese ban on the carrying o f more than five liters o f rice per person and occasionally vegetables, fruit, and eggs were also blockaded. The blockade was often applied or lifted arbitrarily, and only for brief periods was the flow of rice into the city completely stopped, but the overall volume of rice crossing the border was severely reduced. The price of available rice rose, but with few supplies to spend rupiah on, the value o f the ORI sagged, traders in the marketplace began refusing to accept it, and, as had once been the case with NICA money, it became a currency supported primarily by the authority o f the govern ment that had issued it . 119
In the course of 1947, the Republic made a final attempt to bolster its monetary position in the capital. In order to stop damaging shopping visits to Jakarta, it placed restrictions on the private import of rupiah into the city. At the same time, a Republican central commercial agency (Badan Pusat Djual-Beli) was set up with an official monopoly of all trade in and out of Jakarta; firms wishing to trade had to sell their goods nominally to the BPD, obtain a certificate to that effect signed by the chairman, Ong Eng Die, in Yogya, and repurchase them on the other side of the border. Checks at the border by the army and lasjkar were to provide the coercive sanction to back this measure. The intention was to ensure, on the one hand, that only goods actually necessary for the Revolution were bought in Jakarta, and, on the other, that Republican rice was paid for in rupiah, thereby maintaining the value o f the cu rre n cy .120 In Jakarta itself operations were supervised briefly by a special Republican commissioner, Dr. Halim, known consequently as Dr. Ori, but he was appointed only in mid-June 1947 and resigned in despair within three w eek s.121 Results were meager, for neither the restrictions on importing rupiah nor the BPD trade monopoly could be effectively enforced122 and, while the decline in the value of the rupiah was perhaps slowed, it was not reversed.
On July 17, 1947, the battle for the control of the currency was overtaken by broader events. Pushing out from the occupied cities, Dutch armed forces attacked the Republic and captured large swathes o f territory, putting an end to the cities' enclave status,which had made the conflict over currency possible. ORI continued to circulate within the truncated Republic, and appeared periodically in parts of occupied West Java, generally in the vicinity of powerful pro-Republican guerrilla groups. As a symbol o f control and authority, currency continued to play an essen tially propaganda role in the Revolution on both sides, but its use as an effective weapon was over.
Currency became an important element in the Dutch-Indonesian conflict both because economic and administrative policies were a significant part of the general strategy of both sides, and because the existence o f occupied urban enclaves on Java and Sumatra created a situation in which economic and political boundaries did not coincide. In a period made difficult already by the experience of the Japa nese occupation, general problems of postwar reconstruction, and the economic dis ruption of the continuing conflict over independence, the Republic and the Dutch tried to formulate rational monetary policies not only without the control o f events necessary to ensure that those policies would work, but often in the face of the noncooperation or active hostility of the other side. The outcome satisfied neither side: both were forced to delay introducing their currency much longer than they had originally intended, both currencies depreciated badly, and neither succeeded in ousting the other from the market place. It was only with the Dutch attack, intended in considerable part to expand the enclaves into economically self-sup porting regions, that Republican monetary influence in Dutch-controlled terri tories largely disappeared and the question o f currency ceased to play an impor tant role in the broader struggle.
